(9.30) (Chittamatrin) “How does realizing that all phenomena are like illusions
Eliminate delusions?
After all, a magician who creates an illusion of a woman
Can still develop attachment for that illusory woman.”

The Prasangikas say that realizing all phenomena are illusory functions to eliminate our delusions which bind us in samsara. Here the Chittamatrins are asking how does that work? Just realizing something is an illusion does not eliminate the delusions that arise in our mind. The Chittamatrins use the example of an illusory woman created by a magician. They say that even though the magician knows the woman is an illusion he still develops attachment with respect to the appearance. Therefore, simply knowing that something is an illusion does not actually function to eliminate the delusions of attachment and so forth. A more modern example would be computer generated porn.  Everyone knows that such images are generated by a computer and there is not actually a woman there, but nonetheless people generate attachment for it, including likely the people who make it. A modern day Chittamatrin would say if we generate attachment for these things that we know are not real, then knowing that all phenomena are illusions will not eliminate our attachment.  

(9.31) This is because the magician has not abandoned
The deluded tendency to grasp at true existence.
Thus, when he beholds the illusory woman,
His tendency to perceive her emptiness is very weak.

We are like a child that keeps being fooled by the same magician’s trick again and again.    The illusion is of something that looks like a non-illusion – it is an illusion that appears real.  We then relate to this illusion as if it were real, and create contaminated karma, which ripens in the future in more similar illusions.  We are then told that it is just an illusion, but we get fooled again, like a child with a magic trick.  This happens because we have many tendencies of being gullible with respect to samsara.

The reason for this is not difficult to understand. There are two types of delusion, intellectually formed delusions and innate delusions. Having knowledge that things are illusions or computer generated might reduce our attachment somewhat because it counters the intellectually formed delusion. But simply the intellectual knowledge that it is an illusory woman or a computer generated image does not counter our innate delusions. For example, when people watch scary movies they have emotional reactions even though they know that it is just a movie. Why does this happen? Because while their conscious mind knows that it is just a movie, their subconscious mind (their innate delusions essentially) still believe that the images are real and part of their mind reacts as if they are.

To overcome this, we need to realize emptiness with increasingly subtle levels of our mind. Our innate delusions are located deeper within our subconscious and they can only be countered by placing the Dharma underneath the level of our delusion. Ultimately, we need to realize emptiness with our very subtle mind which is underneath all of our subtle minds. By realizing emptiness with our very subtle mind, we can uproot all of our innate delusions and then such appearances will no longer generate delusions in us because we realize at a deeper level that they are not real.  

Through reminding ourselves of emptiness again and again, we can gradually come to see the trick, and then we are no longer fooled by it.  If we think what appears to our mind is real, we can get sucked into it and we can quickly become schizophrenic – believing hallucinations are real.  If we remind ourselves that it is just appearances projected by our mind, but that none of them are real, then even those these things will appear, we won’t worry about it and won’t react to the appearances as if they were real.  Through training consistently with this, eventually we cut the power of the appearances over us.

(9.27cd) (Chittamatrin) “Samsara, like all imputed objects, must have something substantial as its basis;
Otherwise, it would be completely empty, just like space.”

Here, the Chittamatrins make the argument that all of us tend to think before we start studying the Dharma. When we hear Buddhists say everything is empty, we take it to mean that nothing exists at all. If there is not something there that the object refers to or there isn’t an object there, then nothing exists at all and we fall into the extreme of nihilism or nothingness. Therefore, the Chittmatrins say there must be something substantial as the basis of samsara otherwise it doesn’t exist at all. Once again it is very important for us to identify how we ourselves hold onto the doubts and objections raised by the other philosophical schools. It is only when we identify these views within our own mind that the Prasangika refutation functions to dismantle our own ignorance.

(9.28) If imputed phenomena, such as samsara, had truly existent bases,
How could you ever become bound in samsara and how could you ever escape from it?
According to you, mind cannot be an apprehender related to something it apprehends;
Rather, it must be an isolated cognition of itself.

(9.29) If the mind exists inherently, or independently,
Then it is already free from all defilements,
And it follows that all living beings are already enlightened!
So what is the point of teaching that everything is just the nature of mind?

All of this is quite technical, so I will try to simplify it to the main points.

All schools, below Madhyamika-Prasangika would say there is a basis in which the object can be found to exist.  The different schools say they can find it in different parts of the basis.  Some say it is in the body, some say it is in the mind, some say it is in the consciousness, and some say it is in a part of the consciousness called the ‘conciousness basis of all.’  But all of these views are the same in that they think there is something actually there from its own side that is something more than mere karmic appearance of mind.  They argue there must be something, otherwise there is nothing, which is not possible.

Only the Prasangikas say there is nothing there in the basis where the object can be found.  They make a distinction between the basis of imputation and the imputation itself.  The lower schools say the object is one with its basis (this would be an inherently existent thing), the Prasangikas make a distinction between the two.  The extreme of non-existence says if things do not exist inherently, they do not exist at all.  The Prasangikas say things exist as mere imputation that function.  A Mexican salad does not exist from its own side, but it still functions to give us a good lunch.  A car does not exist from its own side, but it still functions to take us around town.  If you search for something more than the appearance of a microphone, you will find nothing.  But the appearance still accomplishes an illusion-like function in this illusory world.  Ordinary appearance is it ‘looks like something is there, outside of the mind.’  But for the Prasangikas, other than the appearance of the microphone, there is no microphone.  We then use this appearance to remind us that there is in fact nothing there.  The more it appears, the more it reminds us, and so our understanding deepens. 

In fact, the Prasangikas turn the debate by saying if samsara did exist from its own side, how could you ever become enmeshed in it, and if you were within it, how could you ever escape from it?  It is only by embracing the Prasangika view that liberation becomes possible.

All this discussion of self-cognizers is important for the following reason.  Something can only be established to exist if it is known by mind.  All the schools agree with this.  So the question the Prasangikas pose to the Chittamatrins is ‘what knows mind, how do you establish the mind itself.’  The Chittmatrins say there is part of the mind which knows itself – a self-cognizer, and it is this that exists from its own side.  The Prasangikas say a mind cannot know itself for the same reason a blade cannot cut itself.    

This is not an academic debate, but has very important implications for our Mahamudra meditations where we take as the main object of our meditation the mind itself.  If the mind cannot know itself, how can we meditate on our mind itself?  For our Mahamudra meditations to be successful, we need to find the right object, so getting this right is very important.

(9.23cd) When we remember the object experienced, we remember the consciousness related to it,
Just as we would recall being poisoned by an animal bite when we experienced the pain that subsequently occurred.

Prasangikas do not deny that the mind can know its basis of imputation, they simply deny that the mind can know itself. This is a central tenant of the Prasangikas – they make a distinction between the basis of imputation and the imputation itself. For example, the basis of imputation of a forest is many trees. The forest is the object itself, and the basis is the trees. In the same way, the basis of imputation of a mind is the aggregates of consciousness, discrimination, feeling, and compositional factors.  The Prasangikas say the mind can know its basis, it simply cannot know itself.  The mind can know a consciousness associated with the mind, it just can’t see itself, the mere imputation mind. Therefore, the ability to remember our previous moments of consciousness does not establish the existence of self-cognizers – namely a mind that knows itself – rather it merely establishes that the mind can know its basis of imputation, which includes consciousness. The Prasangikas have no problem with that. When we remember a previous mind, we are remembering a previous awareness of its basis of imputation, in this case consciousness.   

(9.24ab) (Chittamatrin) “If people who have attained states such as tranquil abiding can see the minds of others far away,
Surely one can see one’s own mind, which is very close.”

Both the Chittamatrins and the Prasangikas agree that when we attain tranquil abiding we gain certain clairvoyance that enable us to see the minds of other living beings far away. Here, the Chittamatrins assert if when we attained tranquil abiding we can know others’ minds, then certainly we can know our own mind. This shows that it is perfectly possible for a mind to know a mind.

(9.24cd) People who apply magical eye lotion can see treasure vases deep beneath the ground,
But they cannot see the lotion!

(9.25) We have no intention of refuting the existence of
Eye awareness, ear awareness, or any other awareness.
What needs to be abandoned is the awareness that grasps at truly existent forms and so forth,
Which is the fundamental cause of all suffering.

The Prasangikas first point out that distance or proximity has nothing to do with knowing. Just because our mind is close and others’ minds are farther away does not mean we should have any greater ability to see one or the other. Additionally, the Prasangikas agree that we can have awarenesses, including being aware of others’ minds. We just cannot know directly our own mind. The object to be abandoned by the Prasangikas is truly existent forms, namely forms that exist in the way that they appear, independent of the mind. The Chittamatrins say that all forms do exist truly because they are aspects of the mind and the mind itself exists truly. Therefore, they say all forms truly exist. The Prasangikas argue that the mind does not truly exist, but agree that forms are aspects of the mind. The primary part of the Chittamatrin view refuted by the Prasangikas is the truly existent mind.

(9.26ab) (Chittamatrin) “Illusion-like forms are not other than the mind,
But neither can they be considered to be one with the mind.”

Here, the Chittamatrins agree that forms are illusion-like, but they have a different understanding of the term. The object to be abandoned for Chittamatrins is the existence of external objects. An external object is an object that exists outside of the mind. Therefore, for the Chittamatrins, they agree that illusion-like forms are the root of samsara and argue that their view also refutes the existence of such illusion-like forms and therefore holders of Chittamatrin views can escape from samsara. Just as the Prasangikas make a distinction between the basis of imputation and the imputation itself, the Chittamatrins make a distinction between illusion-like forms and the mind itself. Objects are aspects of the mind, but their appearing to exist externally from the mind is the root of samsara because in fact they do not exist in that way. Therefore, they say that illusion-like forms are not other than mind, meaning they are still aspects of and by nature the mind. But they are nonetheless different from the mind in the sense that they are illusions. In this sense, they cannot be considered the same thing as the mind. This enables the Chittamatrins to agree that grasping at illusion-like forms is the root of samsara while still positing that the mind itself exists inherently.

If they are true, why say they are not other than the mind?
And if they are not other than the mind, why say they are true?

(9.27ab) Just as illusion-like forms lack any true existence,
So it is with the mind that beholds them.

Here the Prasangikas say that just as forms lack true existence, the same is true for the mind that knows them. It is perfectly possible for a non-truly existent mind to know a non-truly existent form. But how is it possible for a truly existent mind to know a non-truly existent form? How can something true come into contact with something not true?  If they can’t come into contact with each other, then how can any object be established?

(9.19cd) (Chittamatrin) “When clear crystal turns blue, it does so in dependence upon something else;
But lapis lazuli is by nature blue – it does not depend upon anything else to appear blue.

(9.20ab) (Chittamatrin) “Similarly, some awarenesses are related to objects other than themselves,
Whereas others, such as self-cognizers, are not.”

The Chittamatrins agree that mind knows, but they say there are two different types of cognizer: cognizers that know other phenomena and cognizers that know themselves, or self cognizers. To illustrate the difference, they give the analogy of an object that reflects as blue and an object that is by nature blue.  According to the Chittamatrins, when the mind knows other phenomena, the mind itself is like the crystal that appears blue when it comes into contact with a blue object. The mind itself is crystal, and the crystal appearing is the mind appearing as the blue object. The Prasangikas agree with this.  Again, the Prasangikas agree objects are the nature of mind. Where they disagree is the nature of the mind itself.  Chittamatrins say that the mind truly exists, whereas the Prasangikas say it does not. To illustrate how an object that knows can know itself, the Chittamatrins use the example of lapis lazuli which is by nature blue. In the same way a self-cognizer is by nature knowing of itself.   

(9.20cd)The blueness of lapis lazuli does not exist without depending upon anything else –
It does not create its own nature!

It is incorrect to say that lapis lazuli is inherently blue. Its blueness itself arises from various causes and conditions. Blueness is not an inherent characteristic of lapis lazuli. But we can say that lapis lazuli is by nature blue.  This makes a clear distinction between the object – lapus lazuli – and its defining characteristic – its blueness.  In the same way, we cannot say that the ability of the mind to know is an inherent characteristic of the mind, because that would say the mind is knowing. But we can say that the defining characteristic of a mind is the ability to know since that is part of its valid basis.  

(9.21) (Chittamatrin) “Even though a lamp does not illuminate itself, it is the nature of illumination.”
Then you should say that mind does not know itself
But is the nature of conscious illumination.
However, you cannot say that it is known by a mind that is substantially different from itself.

Here the Prasangikas are making a difference between something that is by nature something and something that is inherently something.  To be inherently something means that the object is its defining characteristic. To be by nature something means to have a defining characteristic or the substance of the object is something. For something to be inherently existent means to exist independently of everything else. If something arises in dependence upon causes and conditions, then it necessarily does not exist inherently. The blueness of lapis lazuli arises from causes and conditions, therefore it does not exist inherently.

(9.22) According to you, if there is no truly existent awareness that knows mind,
Then mind does not exist;
In which case it makes no more sense to discuss whether the mind illuminates itself or not
Than it does to discuss the looks of the daughter of a childless person.

Remember both the Chittamatrins and the Prasangikas agree that for an object to exist it must be known by a valid mind.  If the Chittamatrins cannot establish a truly existent mind that knows itself then it cannot establish the existence of a mind, and then therefore there is nothing that could know anything or attain enlightenment. To talk about a mind that does not exist that knows something is like speaking of the child of a childless woman.  An object cannot be known by something that does not exist.

(9.23ab) (Chittamatrin) “If self-cognizers do not exist,
How do we remember subjective consciousness?”

What follows is some back and forth debate between the Chittamatrins and the Prasangikas about the existence of self-cognizers. The Chittamatrins put forward a variety of different proofs or reasons trying to establish the existence of self-cognizers. In this section, the Prasangikas refute the Chittamatrin proofs.

Since both the Chittamatrins and the Prasangikas agree that objects can only be established in dependence upon being known by a valid mind, how the mind knows itself is central to the debate about self-cognizers. The first argument that the Chittamatrins give to establish self-cognizers is the existence of memory of our previous minds. The Prasangikas say that a mind cannot know itself. The Chittamatrins assert that the mind exists truly, but to establish that they must have a mind that knows the mind. The Chittamatrins say that the Prasangikas are wrong that a mind cannot know itself because a mind can remember previous moments of mind. Therefore, mind can know itself. We will refute this argument in the next post.

(9.16) Since for you Chittamatrins such illusion-like forms do not exist,

How do forms exist?

Instead of directly refuting the question posed by the Chittamatrins, the Prasangikas flip the tables and ask the question how then in their system do forms exist? Why do the Prasangikas do this? The Prasangikas are known as consequentialists. What this means is they will expose absurd consequences of the positions asserted by the other schools as a way of demonstrating that their tenets are not tenable.

(Chittamatrin) “Although forms do not exist as external objects, they do exist in another way –

A form is an aspect, the nature of the mind to which it appears.”

It is very important to get to know exactly how things exist in the Chittamatrin system. The final view of emptiness – the Tantra Prasangika view – is actually the union of the Prasangika and Chittamatrin view.  What is the Tantra Prasangkika view? The Prasangika part says that all phenomena are mere projections of mind, and the Chittamatrin part says that these appearances themselves are the nature of mind. More profoundly, the Chittamatrin part says that all phenomena are the nature of mind, specifically the mind of great bliss, and the Prasangika part says that the mind itself is empty of inherent existence.  Here, the Chittamatrins say that external objects do not exist but that forms are the nature of the mind to which it appears. The Tantra Prasangika view entirely agrees. External objects are objects that exist independent of the mind. Such objects do not exist in either the Chittamatrin view or the Prasangika view. But how do forms exist? They exist as aspects of the mind. They are like waves on the ocean. Just as you cannot separate a wave from the ocean, so too you cannot separate a wave-like form from the ocean of its mind.

(9.17) You Chittamatrins assert that mind itself appears in the aspect of form.

If this is so, how does the mind arise?

Buddha, the Protector of the World, has said

That the mind cannot behold itself.

(9.18ab) For example, just as the blade of a sword cannot cut itself,

So a mind cannot behold itself.

Where the Prasangikas and the Chittamatrins disagree is on the nature of the mind itself. The Chittamatrins say that the mind truly exists. The Prasangikas say that the mind is also empty. The Prasangikas do not disagree that phenomena are aspects of or are the nature of mind, they simply disagree about the ultimate nature of the mind itself.

The fundamental question the Prasangikas ask of the Chittamatrins is how does the mind arise or come into existence? Since the Chittamatrins say that the mind truly exists the question becomes how does it come into existence?  The answer the Chittamatrins give is the mind knows itself. How is this an answer? Both Prasangikas and the Chittamatrins agree that objects only exist if they are known by a valid mind. Therefore, they seek to establish the existence of the mind that has the ability to know itself – which is called a self-cognizer. The entire debate between the Chittamatrins and the Prasangikas revolves around the existence of self-cognizers.  If the Chittamatrins cannot establish a mind that knows the truly existent mind, then they would have to agree that a truly existent mind does not exist because there is no valid mind that knows it. The Prasangikas therefore refute the possibility of a mind that knows itself.

Their first refutation is scriptural authority in which Buddha says that a mind cannot know itself.  The analogy given in the scriptures is just as a blade cannot cut itself so too a mind cannot know itself.

(9.18cd) (Chittamatrin) “On the contrary, just as a lamp can illuminate both itself and the objects around it,

So the mind can behold both itself and other phenomena.”

The Chittamatrins argue as an analogy that just as a lamp can illuminate itself and all the phenomena around it, so too the mind can know itself and other phenomena. A light simply illuminates all things, including itself.  In the same way, the mind simply knows all things, including itself.  

(9.19ab) If a lamp illuminates itself, then darkness obscures itself,

And it follows that no one can see darkness because it is obscured!

Here the Prasangikas try to expose an absurd consequence that follows from believing the Chittamatrin position.  Since light and dark are relative concepts, opposite of one another, if it is true that a light illuminates itself then it follows that darkness obscures itself. Why is this true? Darkness is the absence of light, but if it is an existent it must still be something that is known. So if light knows itself then how does darkness know itself? Darkness is the nature of obscurity and so therefore it would follow that darkness obscures itself, at which point it could not be known. Therefore, there must be something that sees the light and sees the darkness that is separate from the light and the darkness itself. In the same way, to know a mind there must be something else that knows it.  It can’t know itself.

Further, it is incorrect to say that light illuminates itself. The light of a lamp may illuminate the lamp that holds the light, but the light itself does not illuminate itself it is simply the nature of luminescence. In the same way the mind does not know itself, it is simply the nature of knowing.  

(9.13cd) (Proponent of things) “If, as you say, nirvana is not truly existent,
But samsara exists conventionally,

(9.14ab) (Proponent of things) “Then Buddha must be in samsara because nirvana does not exist;
So what is the point of practising the Bodhisattva’s way of life?”

The objection here is if nirvana does not truly exist then there is no point in striving to attain it. But because Prasangikas say that that conventional phenomena do exist, if buddhas exist they must exist in samsara. To say otherwise would be to say Buddhas exist in a non-existent place.

This often comes up, what is the point if nothing really exists, if nothing actually exists, what’s the point?   What is the point of helping illusion-like sentient beings and making offerings and requests to Buddhas who aren’t actually there, etc.? 

(9.12cd) Even an illusion does not cease if the continuum of its causes is not cut,
But once the continuum of samsara’s causes, delusions, is severed,

(9.15) Samsara will not occur, even conventionally.
Since Buddhas have done this, they have attained nirvana.

Well the first point of realizing emptiness of things is to stop taking things, especially ourselves, so damned seriously!  We are a bunch of ‘Drama Queens.’  Recognizing that there is nothing really there helps us stop making such a big deal out of things and see them for what they really are – the reflections of our deluded mind. 

The second point is even though living beings do not actually exist, they nonetheless have minds that experience feelings.  We do not actually exist, but we still experience a wide variety of feeling that hurt.  It is the same with others.  We help free others not because they are real, but because they are experiencing pain. 

A third point is they are not separate from us.  Each being, each Buddha is a different aspect of our mind.  When we help others, from the perspective of emptiness, it is one part of our mind helping another part of our mind.  If we seek to liberate ourself, we need to liberate all beings because all are us.

Another point is by not responding with wisdom and compassion, the appearances to our mind will get worse and worse and we will lose sight of the fact that they are mere appearances and we will get swept away by our problems into samsara.  How many times have we received teachings on emptiness, yet all of that flies out of the window when we start to have some problems in our life?  Just because intellectually we may have a certain understanding that none of this is real, at a deep instinctive level, an innate level, we still grasp at it being real.  By not caring for others, etc., our dream will get worse and worse and we will get sucked in.

Another point is we respond to these appearances with wisdom and compassion as a method for generating the state of ultimate happiness, enlightenment, in our own mind.  Generating compassion for dream-like sentient beings is a method for producing the effect of dream-like enlightenment within our own mind.

Finally, it is our responsibility.  Since everything is coming from our mind, it is our main responsibility to bring an end to our own and other’s samsara.  Samsara is the illusion created by the mind of our ignorance.   If we stop the causes of the appearance of samara, it will simply cease to exist – it will disappear. 

(9.15cd) (Chittamatrin) “The illusion-like forms that you assert do not exist,
Because you assert that illusion-like awareness lacks true existence.”

The objection here is if the mind does not truly exist how could it possibly know anything? If there is nothing there, there is nothing there to know anything , therefore nothing can be known. If there is not a valid mind knowing the object, then the object does not exist since the definition of an existent is one that is known to a valid mind.

(9.11) Killing an illusion incurs no actual karma of killing
Because an illusion has no mind,
But benefiting or harming an illusion-like person who has an illusion-like mind
Gives rise to merit and negativity respectively.

(9.12) Because the mantras and so forth that cause an illusion cannot produce mind,
An illusion does not develop a mind.
Different types of cause
Give rise to different types of illusion.

(9.13) There does not exist a single cause that is capable of
Giving rise to a variety of different results.

What difference then is there between a person that is an illusion and an illusion-like person?  We say one has a mind and the other does not.  For the latter there are causes that produce a mind in that person, and the former there are not the causes to produce a mind, but other than that, what is the difference?  This is a very good question to contemplate, because the answer will reveal to us much about the meaning of emptiness.

The answer is both are equally illusions, just different levels of complexity of illusion arising in dependence upon different causes and conditions.  Other than that, there is no difference.  Both are equally illusions, just different illusions that arise from different causes and conditions.  In terms of their nature, they are both equally illusions – in other words, even though they appear, there is nothing really there.  We feel there is a huge difference between the two.  Our feeling that there is a difference is our self-grasping ignorance.  In Star Trek there are these things called ‘Holodecks’ which are like a virtual reality of holograms of light in which the holograms are computer programs that think and act and feel as if they are real.   If somebody in the holodeck got angry at us or somebody in ‘real life’ got angry at us, would we feel there is a difference between the two?  What is the difference?  When we realize that reality is equally ‘unreal’ as the holodeck, then we realize it does not matter that somebody is getting angry at us because actually there is nobody getting angry at us, there is just an appearance of somebody getting angry at us.  In truth, there is nobody there!

People appear to us to be male, human, nice, mean, whatever.  And we relate to these appearances as if they were actually true.  No, these are just the reflections of our karma.  There is actually nobody there with any characteristics.  We are essentially schizophrenic, seeing hallucinations and grasping at them as being real.

If people existed from their own side, there would be no point viewing them as Dakas and Dakinis, because it would be a complete waste of time and it would not change anything.  But we know when we view people as emanations, and really believe this to be the case, it changes everything.  We view things completely differently.  We may object, ‘yes, we view it like that, but it is not really like that.’  I agree, it is not ‘really’ like that, but that does not mean it is ‘really’ like the other thing either.  It is actually not ‘really’ like anything.  It is just appearance to mind.

I would like to say that all things are illusions.  We often hear the language that says ‘illusion-like’ and ‘dream-like’.  We allow some grasping to remain with the ‘like’ part of this formulation.  No, all the things we normally see are illusions.  The difference is they are different illusions arising from different causes and conditions.  But their quality of being illusions is exactly the same.  Things are dreams, not just “dream like.”  The difference is different dreams arising from different levels of mind (gross or subtle).  But their quality of being a dream is exactly the same.  We hear “illusion-like” and “dream-like,” and we transfer all our grasping into the like part.  We need to realize just how radical the Prasangika position is.  We need to know what specifically are the differences between illusions and illusion-like phenomena (different causes and conditions, nothing else) and the difference between dreams and dream-like phenomena (different levels of mind).  All are equally illusions in the sense of not existing in the way that they appear, and all are equally dreams in being mere projections of mind. 

If there is no difference, why do we create different karma by killing an illusion-like woman than killing an illusion of a woman?  First of all, what is the difference in karma of the four effects?  We can consider the case of killing somebody in a video game and killing somebody in our waking life. The person we kill in a video game does not have a mind whereas the person we kill in our waking life does. Both are equally illusions and there is nobody actually there, but the complexity of the illusion in our waking life is higher therefore it will have different karmic effects. The ripened effect of killing somebody in our waking state is to be thrown into a hellish rebirth, in particular the reviving hells. The ripened effect of killing somebody in a video game would be perhaps taking rebirth as somebody who is schizophrenic who has experiences appearances of people killing them but not actually happening. The tendency similar to the cause of killing in our waking state is too be more likely to kill again in our waking state. The tendency similar to the cause of killing in a video game is too be more willing to kill again in future video games or other simulation type experiences. The effect similar to the cause of killing in our waking state is to be killed in our waking state; the effect similar to the cause of killing in our video game is to be killed in a future video game or to have our opportunities killed in our waking state. The environmental effect of killing in our waking state is to be reborn in a hostile environment; the environmental effect of killing in a video game would be to either be attracted to more violent video games or to once again be schizophrenic imagining we live in a hostile environment when in fact we do not.

(9.9abc) Just as you receive merits you consider to be truly existent from making offerings to a Buddha you consider to be truly existent,
So we receive illusion-like merits from making offerings to an illusion-like Buddha.

We can sometimes think that if things do not exist inherently then nothing on the stages of the path will actually work because nothing is actually happening. To overcome this doubt we can consider dreams. It is clear that dreams are mere projections of mind, but we nonetheless do things in our dreams and our actions have effects in our dreams. For example if we get in a car and go someplace in the dream ultimately we are not going anywhere, but conventionally with respect to the appearances we are going from one place to another. In exactly the same way, when we engage in the stages of the path to enlightenment and other virtuous actions, ultimately we are doing nothing, but conventionally we are shaping the karma which determines what appears to our mind. Our actions have effects within our dream-like state. The merit that we accumulate through engaging in virtuous actions does not inherently exist, but it nonetheless functions. The blessings we receive from buddhas ultimately do not exist, but they still function within our mind to move it toward enlightenment. Buddhas themselves ultimately do not exist but nonetheless function to lead us along the stages of the path. Things do not have to truly exist to function and our actions do not have to truly exist in order to create causes. Dream actions create dream effects, it’s as simple as that.

(9.d) (Proponent of things) “If, as you say, living beings lack true existence and are like illusions,
How can they take rebirth after they die?”

(9.10) Provided all the necessary conditions are assembled,
Even an illusion will come into being.
Why, simply by virtue of their longer duration,
Should living beings be any more true?

Even we are like illusions.  We ourselves and all living beings are like illusions.  We come into existence in dependence upon causes and conditions and we will disappear at the time of death, just like an illusion comes to an end.  Sometimes people say the dream world is not true because it does not last long, but the waking world must have some truth to it because there is a continuum to it – the appearances we see have a longer duration.  But what about a longer duration makes the appearances any more true?  A short 30-minute video or a 9-hour Lord of the Rings epic are equally fictional tales.

We can sometimes likewise object thinking that the appearances in our dream cease when the dream ceases but the appearances we see when we are awake continue to appear day after day. Surely this means there’s a difference between the appearances of our dream and the appearances of our waking state. Actually no. First, it is not uncommon for people to have recurring dreams and see similar things in one dream after another. I have a friend who has narcolepsy and he actually spends more time in his dream state than he does in his waking state. For him every time he goes into his dreams he returns to the same place where he has a family a job a home and so forth. For him, his dream state is actually more his reality than his waking state. Second, The strength of our karmic actions determines the duration of the appearances that arise from that action. For example certain concentrations that are particularly strong can create the karma for rebirth as a long life god. Some actions which are very superficial only create a very short duration appearance, whereas other actions can create appearances that last for a very long time period in general, the extent or strength of our concentration determines the duration of the karma created. Our actions in the dream state tend to be more superficial, so it is normal that the duration of the appearances of the dream state are likewise short in nature. In contrast, our actions during the waking state tend to be stronger or more intense, and as a result the karma we create will last for a longer duration.  

But then we object, ‘but this world has a complete past from before I was here and has a future after I am gone, whereas when we dream it does not.’  How can we overcome this doubt?  First, it is not true.  When we dream, it also comes complete with an entire past and future – we have many dreams where there is an understood past or an anticipated future, even though none of it actually is real.  The past and future appear vividly and completely.  Second, the past and future are recreated all the time.  Every time we make a decision, we invent a new future for ourself.  This new future exerts an influence on the present.  The same is true for how we relate to and interpret our past.  Perhaps for a time we viewed a certain event in our past as our greatest curse, but later we came to see it as our greatest blessing.  Neither the past nor the future are fixed, but are constantly being recreated. 

But we may think, ‘OK, I see how that is true for myself, but even if I reinterpret my past and recreate a new future, all other living beings will have a long past in samsara and a future in samsara long after I have left for the pure land.  So there must be a difference.”  As long as the causes and conditions for suffering sentient beings in samsara remain assembled, a samsara filled with such beings will continue to appear.  But when these causes and conditions are removed, samsara will just dissappear, like an illusion or a dream.  If last night we dreamt of somebody in a wheelchair, who put them there? Clearly both the person and the wheelchair are coming from our own mind. In exactly the same way, if we see somebody in our waking state experiencing suffering, who created it?

Conventionally, of course, the person created the karma to experience whatever they experience. But ultimately, the person in our waking state is equally just a person in our dream. If they appear to inhabit samsara it is because we have mentally created other living beings of our dream to remain in samsara. Likewise, if we purify completely our own mind then the beings that appear to our mind will likewise appear to be completely pure, therefore also having been freed from samsara.

This can raise a question of whether Buddhas see suffering sentient beings. If a Buddha is omniscient, then surely they know that we are still drowning within samsara. If they do not know that we are still drowning in samsara, then how can we say that they are omniscient? The answer is Buddhas see all living beings as already Buddhas because this view functions to ripen living beings to become Buddhas. They do not see us as already having attained enlightenment because we actually have already attained enlightenment. We have or have not done anything because the things we normally see do not exist. But them maintaining the view of us having already attained enlightenment functions to bless our mind to be able to attain that state. If they continued to see us in samsara, then they would be mentally projecting us to be in samsara which a compassionate Buddha would not be willing to do.

This then can create the doubt of do Buddhas see our past as having previously been in samsara? Again, the answer is no. When Buddha attain enlightenment they see all living beings as having always been enlightened because that is again the most compassionate view they can maintain for other living beings. By viewing our past as having always been pure, it functions to bless our mind to reinterpret our own past to also see it as having always been pure.

(9.7d) (Proponent of things) “Then it is incorrect to say that things exist even conventionally.”

(9.8) No, there is no fault, because things exist by conventional valid cognizers.
From the point of view of worldly people, seeing things is seeing reality;
But worldly people never actually see reality
Because the real nature of things is their emptiness.

Throughout Shantideva’s guide, there are a series of debates between the different philosophical schools. To indicate the views of the Prasangikas, Shantideva puts in italics the views that he is refuting.  Since it is not always obvious which school of thought the different parts in italics refer to, I will indicate in parentheses which school of thought the particular doubt comes from. In this context, the last line of verse 7 represents the views of the proponents of things.

As we go through the debates in Shantideva’s guide, we can sometimes feel tempted to just jump straight to the Prasangikas refutation because we know that is the final view that we are after. This is a big mistake. The debates between the Prasangikas and the other schools of thought only have power to move our mind if we first realize how we ourselves have the same doubt or objection that the other schools of thought are raising.  Each time we see italics in Shantideva’s guide, we should first spend some time to generate and identify how we ourselves have the different doubts or objections referred to by the lower schools. We almost need to first convince ourselves of the doubt of the other view, thinking, “yeah, that’s right.”  Only when we actually think in the way that the other schools think will Shantideva’s dismantling of that view move our mind. If we fail to realize how we ourselves are still holders of the views of the lower schools, Shantideva’s refutations will not function to move our mind.  But if we first identify how we are holders of these other views, then Shantideva’s refutation will actually move our mind and change our mind. We will realize, “oh yeah, I see, I was wrong.”  In this way, going through the debates itself is a method for arriving at the correct view of emptiness. We gradually chip away at all of our wrong understandings until we are left with the correct view of the Prasangikas.

Here, the objection of the proponents of things is that if things do not truly exist then they do not exist at all. This is known as the extreme of non-existence. They say if things are only mere appearances to mind, like in a dream, then nothing is real and nothing exists. If nothing exists, then nothing exists conventionally either. Nothing exists at all. We fall into the extreme of nihilism.  In truth, we all think this way.  For example, when a child has a nightmare, we say don’t worry it’s not real, it does not exist. Whereas we think that if a monster was actually in the child’s room, then it would exist, it would be real, and therefore it would be appropriate to be afraid. If we are saying that the monster in the room is also just a mere appearance to mind, not real, then why should we fear it?  But if we do not fear it, it will eat us and harm us. Therefore, it is appropriate for us to be afraid. Similarly, we think if the things we normally see do not exist at all then why bother generating compassion for others who appear to be suffering. They are not really suffering. There is no one there suffering at all. So why care?  

So how do we answer this doubt?  Geshe-la once said, ‘that which is conceived by ignorance, we believe to be the truth.’  In other words, things appear to us to exist independent of mind, and we assent to that appearance as if it were true, objectively true.  For example, somebody who is paranoid will project a world full of threats, and the person relates to these appearances as if they were objectively true.  They do not even put into question whether they are just projections of their mind because these appearances appear so vividly.  We are exactly the same.  This whole world is appearing to us and it appears as if we have nothing to do with its creation.  It is there functioning on its own and we are just observing what is taking place.

Geshe-la has said many times, ‘the things we normally see do not exist at all.’  This is because what we normally see are inherently existent things.  These things do not exist at all.  It is worth walking around the town repeating this like a mantra to gain some experience of it.

To understand the Prasangika view, it is worth it to understand a little more clearly what is meant by illusion-like things.  With respect to an illusion, it looks like there is something, but there is not actually.  What appears to be, does not actually exist.  It just appears that way.  So too it is with all things.  It looks like there is a table, for example, but there is not actually one there.  The table does not actually exist, it just appears to.  It appears that way.  When certain causes and conditions are assembled together, it creates an illusion-like appearance of something actually being there, like a rainbow or a Mexican salad.  Everything is like this, illusion-like effects from the assemblage of causes and conditions.  When we assent to that appearance, and engage in actions on that basis, we plant contaminated karma on our mind which ripens later as the appearance of objects that exist from their own side.  Thus, the cycle becomes self-perpetuating.

So how do things exist? They exist by convention. We all agree to call something the same thing if it has the same nature, aspect, and function. For example, something that is made of metal, has four wheels and an engine, and functions to take us places, we all agree by convention to call it a car. It’s “carness” does not exist on the side of the car, rather conventionally everyone agrees to call that thing a car. If last night we dreamt of a car, it does not exist as anything more than a mere appearance to our mind, but it still can function to take us from one dream place to another dream place. It functions within the dream. In exactly the same way the car of our waking state is a mere projection of our mind, a label we impute upon a collection of wheels and an engine, but it still functions to take us from one place to another.  Both of the places that it is taking us to and from are likewise just mere appearances to our mind as is the car that takes us between them. But the places still accomplish the function of being a place and the car still accomplishes the function of taking us to places, therefore even though these things do not exist as anything more than mere imputation to our mind, they still function and exist conventionally.

Here Geshe-la introduces the term “conventional valid cognizer.”  A cognizer is a mind that knows an object. A valid cognizer is a mind that knows something correctly.  A conventional valid cognizer is a mind that knows something correctly according to convention. For example, if I call a tennis racquet a spaghetti strainer, that is not a conventional valid cognizer.  But if I call a tennis racket a tennis racket and a spaghetti strainer a spaghetti strainer, then my mind has conventional valid cognizers.  

But it is useful to recall the first verse of Chapter 9 in which it said that conventional appearances are mistaken appearances. We might wonder how it is possible for a conventional valid cognizer to be a valid cognizer yet at the same time a mistaken appearance. It is a mistaken appearance in the sense that the way in which it exists does not correspond with the way that it appears. But it is still a conventional valid cognizer in the sense that conventionally we all agree this is a car. According to worldly people that is a car, and Prasangikas have no disagreement with worldly people.

But this then raises the question of do Buddhas see the car?  If the car is a mistaken appearance and Buddhas only know truth, how can they possibly know the car?  The answer is when a Buddha sees a car, what they are actually seeing is emptiness appearing in the aspect of a car. The car that a Buddha sees is emptiness appearing as car. The car that we normally see is a conventional valid cognizer, a conventional appearance, but a mistaken appearance. The car that we normally see does not exist at all. It still continues to function in our non-existent world that we inhabit, but it doesn’t actually exist at all. The car that a Buddha sees does exist, but it exists as a manifestation of emptiness. And it still functions in an all-empty world.

(9.5) When you proponents of things see things,
You do not recognize their illusion-like character
But assert them to be inherently existent.
This is where we Madhyamika-Prasangikas disagree with you.

In our earlier preparations for this chapter, I offered a series of analogies to help us understand the correct view of emptiness. One of those analogies is that all things are like an illusion. What do all illusions have in common? They appear in one way but they exist in another. For example, the illusory tiger appears to the audience to be an actual tiger, but in fact it is just an illusion created by the magician. There is no tiger actually there. Inherent existence and true existence are synonymous. True existence says that objects exist in the way that they appear. Prasangikas refute true existence. They say objects do not exist in the way that they appear. Objects appear to exist from their own side independent of the mind, whereas in fact objects are mere projections created by the mind, like in a dream. In this sense, they do not exist in the way that they appear and are therefore like illusions. All proponents of things believe objects do truly exist. This is the fundamental difference between the Prasangikas and all of the other philosophical schools.

(9.6) Forms that we see directly are just mere appearance to mind.
They exist falsely because the way they appear
Does not correspond to the way they exist,
Just as a human body is conventionally accepted as clean when in reality it is impure.

‘True’ in a Dharma context means to exist in the way it appears.  Truly existent means to exist in the way that it appears. Things appear to exist from their own side, but they do not exist that way, so they are falsely existent.  In reality, there is nothing other than the mere appearance of mind.

What is a mere appearance to mind? An appearance to mind means something that appears to our mind. For example, there are objects that appear to our eyes, objects that appear to our ears, and so forth.  There are also objects that appear to our mind, for example remembering the face of our mother. Normally we think there is a big difference between objects that appear to our senses and objects that appear to our mind. We understand that the objects that appear to our mind are simply mental projections, but we believe that the objects that appear to our senses actually exist out there independent of our mind. Shantideva is saying that all objects are equally appearances to mind. The memory of our mother and the car that we see with our eyes are equally just mere appearances to mind.  There is no difference in their fundamental nature. Mere in this context means that there is nothing to objects that is somehow more than just an appearance to mind.  Mere here means that the objects we perceive are nothing more than a simple appearance to mind. If we look for something that exists behind the appearance or something that the appearance refers to, we find nothing.

(9.7abc) Buddha taught the impermanence of things
To lead people gradually to a realization of emptiness –
The lack of inherent existence of things.

How does impermanence lead us to a realization of emptiness? Impermanence means that all things are constantly changing. They are all temporary in their existence.  To be permanent means to not change.  It means to never change. Something that is permanent never changes. When we look at objects, we typically are grasping at two different things. First, we grasp at the objects as being permanent, in other words unchanging. And second, we grasp at those things as existing from their own side.  For example, when we look at a car, we might say that is the same car that I have had for the last 10 years. As if the car has not changed at all. It is permanent. If we think about it, we of course recognize that the car has changed a lot over the years.  We may have changed the tires, changed the brakes, and so forth. But in our mind, we still think it is the same car. This thinking it is the same car is our grasping at the permanence of the car.

When we grasp at the inherent existence of the car, we think that the car exists independently of all other phenomena.  It exist out there, inside the car somewhere. For something to exist independently, it must also be permanent. If something changes, then it does not exist independently because it has to come into contact with causes and conditions which cause the object to change.  In this way, we can see that permanence is actually an aspect of inherent existence.  It is somewhat easy to understand how things are impermanent or changing. It is more difficult to understand how things lack inherent existence. For this reason, Buddha taught that objects are impermanent to weaken or to cut away at our overall grasping at things existing inherently.