From these debates what we need to develop is conviction that effects are created by their own causes and conditions, including karma and intention.  In dependence upon this conviction, we will realize that we have responsibility, a great responsibility for all the effects in this world. 

Perhaps we can go so far as to say, the responsibility is entirely ours.  What kind of world we live in, what kind of people we live with, inhabitants of that world, whether we’re happy or whether we suffer, is entirely our responsibility. Mine, it is my responsibility.  There’s great resistance to this, because perhaps we feel this world was already in a mess, even before I arrived.  But when we dream, our dream world comes with a complete past.  We want to blame others for everything that is wrong in the world and, above all, how they treat us.  Why should I take responsibility?  We think, I’m hardly responsible for what’s happening on the other side of the world.  In what way am I responsible for any of those things?  Of course, from the perspective of circumstantial causes, we are only indirectly responsible at best.  But because these things are empty, they arise from our karma.  They are created by our mind.  They are occurring within our dream. 

In what way are these things, these effects, in any way dependent upon me sitting in my room doing nothing?  Hmm, we are doing nothing, perhaps that is why our world is degenerating.  When we don’t understand what are the causes and conditions, we have a tendency to say it is caused by something other than ourself, like an external God.

One of the main differences between Buddhism and many other religions is that we take full responsibility, we don’t blame anyone or anything other than our own mind for what happens in the world.  If everything really is created by mind, then it is each individual’s responsibility, isn’t it, for what happens in their world.  Every effect that appears to our mind we must have been involved in in some way, in its creation, surely.  If not, then that thing would be inherently existent.  If there is nothing inherently existent, arising separately from our mind, then we are indeed responsible for everything.

Surely any effect that appears to our mind, we must have been involved in some way in its creation. If we acknowledge that, then really we will take full responsibility.   Not just for ourself but for others too, won’t we?  From the point of view of emptiness, we have to take full responsibility for ourselves and for others.  Even in the section on exchanging self with others, we concluded that others’ faults, whatever fault there is, is ours. It is my fault.  Whatever goes wrong in this world is my fault? That is taking full responsibility, isn’t it?  It is my responsibility to change what happens in the world?  My sole responsibility?  As soon as we include someone else, god-like or non-god, we share the responsibility, it’s not entirely my responsibility, not entirely my fault, which self-cherishing would be quite happy with.

(9.121ab) Precisely what is it that Ishvara is supposed to create?
(Naiyayika and Vaisheshika) “ “He creates the world, living beings, and his own subsequent continuum.”

This is quite similar to conceptions of God held by many religions. Again, our goal in examining these views is not to refute other religions, but rather to identify within our own mind how we still hold onto these views we may have been enculturated into by virtue of living within societies that hold such views. If other people want to believe in such things, we respect that and rejoice in their faith and spiritual path.

But within our own mind, we strive to identify how we are still holding onto different forms of grasping at inherent existence and refute them. One of the areas where we have the most difficulty an understanding emptiness is the relationship between our grasping at inherent existence and production. This is why Shantideva focuses like a laser on demonstrating the contradiction between inherent existence and production of anything. When we dis entangle these two contradictory views our mind naturally opens up into a correct understanding of emptiness.

(9.121cd) But if this is so, how did such an independent creator himself develop?
Moreover, consciousness is produced from its previous continuum,

(9.122) And, since beginningless time, happiness and suffering have been created by karma, or actions.
So, tell us, what does Ishvara create?
If the cause has no beginning,
The effect must also have no beginning.

(9.123) So why, if their production does not depend upon other conditions,
Are effects such as happiness and suffering not constantly produced without interruption?
And if, as you say, there is nothing other than phenomena created by Ishvara,
Upon what conditions does Ishvara depend when he creates an effect?

(9.124) If a collection of causes and conditions produces an effect,
That effect is not produced by Ishvara.
If the causes and conditions are assembled, even
Ishvara does not have the power to prevent the effect being produced;
And, if they are not assembled, he cannot possibly produce that effect.

(9.125) If effects such as suffering are produced without Ishvara’s wishing for them,
It follows that they are produced through the power of something other than him.
You say that all effects are produced according to Ishvara’s wishes,
But those wishes have no power to produce all things, so how can Ishvara be the creator of everything?

Shantideva’s reasoning is like standing in front of a machine gun firing wisdom bullets at our wrong views. His actual reasoning is not difficult to understand. The spiritual practice here is to not intellectually appreciate what he is saying, but rather deeply contemplate each one of these points within our own mind to arrive at a clear and definitive valid cognizer that the view grasping at an external creator of all is completely impossible.

Venerable Tharchin explains that 80% of the meditation on emptiness is identifying correctly the object of negation within our own mind. This is not a philosophical exercise asking ourselves whether inherent existence could exist in the abstract, rather it is a deeply personal investigation of the views held within our own mind to realize how we innately grasp at inherent existence. Only when we fully unearth the different ways in which our mind, perhaps even subconsciously, grasps at inherent existence will contemplating Shantideva’s words produce a profound transformative effect upon our mind. When Shantideva explains the views of the other schools, what he is actually doing is engaging in an extended explanation of the object of negation.

All of us, unless we are already enlightened, still grasp at there being externally existent creation. Intellectually, we call ourselves Kadampas and say of course I don’t think that way.  But denying we still have grasping is a form of laziness, indeed it is a form of deluded pride. It is much better to assume that yes indeed we still have deep grasping about these things, then honestly look within our mind and realize how we hold onto such views, and then contemplate Shantideva’s points. If we practice in this way, it is definite that our mind will change. We will feel our mind unlock and open up as our wrong views are definitively left behind, not simply intellectually refuted as if these views were somehow separate from us.

I could provide commentary on each one of these points. But I do not believe I need to because I think most of them are self-evident if we take the time to contemplate them. It is therefore better for us, on our own, to pause and contemplate deeply each reason to arrive at a clear conclusion that yes it is impossible for there to be an externally existent, permanent creator as we normally grasp at.  

Even if we do not grasp at an external creator of all, we do still grasp at external creation. There is an extent to which our mind is still holding onto these sorts of views. It is not enough to just simply say there is not an external creator of all. We have to realize there is no external creator of anything.

(9.120) Space is not Ishvara because it cannot produce anything,
And a permanent self cannot be Ishvara because this has already been refuted.

The idea here is simple. Shantideva is trying to demonstrate that the way in which people conceive of Ishvara is actually impossible. Space is the absence of obstructive contact. It cannot do or produce anything, so how can it be a creator. Likewise, Ishvara cannot be permanent, because something permanent does not change and if it does not change how can it create anything? The point of these refutations is to help us let go of grasping at and externally existent creator of all. The alternative the Prasangikas offer is mind as the creator of all.

Our goal in explaining these things is not to judge or criticize other religious views. We should never have discussions like this with other people who believe in an inherently existent God. We should leave them free to believe whatever they want. Our job is to look in our own mind and examine what we consider to be a reasonable view.

(Naiyayika and Vaisheshika) “ “Although he is the creator, Ishvara is unknowable.”

This is also something very common that we hear in modern society. It’s usually said in some sort of new-agey mystical sense of the truth is beyond our ability to comprehend it since it is so magical. Because it is unknowable, we therefore think it is something worthy of veneration. We say that whatever is divine must be beyond our limited abilities and so therefore we never think to question or try to understand, we just worship in awe.

What is the point of talking about something that cannot be known?

Shantideva refutes all of these with one simple question, what is the point of talking about something that cannot be known? If it cannot be known, then anything we have to say about it is pure speculation at best. If we can even talk about it, then that implies that there is something of it that can be known, which reveals it is not unknowable. We developed a sort of laziness not wishing to investigate further or a complacency with our ignorance about what is still unknown.  Or worse, we assent to a view that there will always be an unbridgeable gap between us and the divine.

But more profoundly, all of the Buddhist schools agree that for an object to exist it must be able to be known by mind. If it cannot be known by mind then it implies that Buddha is not omniscient, which is in contradiction with fundamental view of enlightenment.

(9.118d) Then why go to the trouble of giving them the name “Ishvara”?

The Prasangikas then ask the very simple question of why do you then call it Ishvara? If it is just the four elements, why do you attribute a personality and God-like intentions?  If all we have are the four elements, then why add the extra God-like qualities?

There are many atheists who ask similar questions of Christians.  Some Christians answer this question by saying God started it all, but then everything else unfolded according to the laws of physics. God also created the laws of physics and phenomena have been unfolding according to those laws. Therefore, they see no contradiction between creationism, namely God is the creator of all, and modern science. But to this too, the Prasangikas could ask the question, why give that the name God? The cause of the Big Bang, for example, could simply be the collision of two universes, why give it the name God and God-like intentions and qualities?

The answer is typically that creation is so magnificent and so intricate only a God-like mind could have created such an amazing creation. But that is simply a variant on the logic of production from no cause. Just because we do not know all the causes and conditions that gave rise to the universe does not mean that there are not perfectly explainable causes and conditions, like the four elements and the variety of causes giving rise to the variety of appearances. There is no need to add additional conceptions of God-like intentions and God-like qualities.  

It is important to note that we should not have these sorts of conversations with others. If others want to believe in God, we should not undermine their faith. We should not poke holes in their beliefs. We do not like it when people challenge or criticize our beliefs, so we shouldn’t do the same to others. If others are generating minds of faith and the conclusions they are arriving at or causing them to engage in virtuous actions, then undermining that does no good. We could wind up being like the son of the woman who was able to cook stones by reciting a special mantra, despite the fact that her mantra was wrong. Because she had faith in the mantra, the mantra worked and she was able to cook the stones. But when her son pointed out that her pronunciation was wrong, her faith was shattered and then she was unable to cook stones whether she pronounced the mantra correctly or incorrectly. In exactly the same way, when we consider ourselves particularly clever and smarter than others because we can refute their, according to us seemingly naive religious views, we wind up being no different than this mother’s arrogant son.

Rather, we should understand that these debates are an internal dialogue we should be having with ourselves. We should identify within ourselves where we have the doubts expressed by the other schools, and then we use the Prasangika reasoning to dismantle those doubts within our own mind. This is the correct way to understand and relate to the debates. 

(9.119) Since the elements such as earth are multiple substances,
Impermanent, unmoved by mind, non-divine,
And something trodden upon and unclean,
They cannot possibly be Ishvara.

It is a contradiction to say that Ishvara, or in a modern western context God, is both everything and completely pure. There are plenty of impure and imperfect things, so either we have to say that God is not everything or that he is impure and imperfect.

The Prasangikas avoid this problem by saying that all things are created by mind. An impure mind creates an impure world and pure mind creates a pure world. The contradiction above only arises if we grasp at an external creator of all that is perfectly pure and perfectly good. As soon as we accept that mind is the creator of all, all these contradictions fall away and what we need to do individually becomes clear, namely purify our mind. The final conclusion of the Prasangikas is that we need to act as a good God would. If we are the creator of all, then we should be kind to our creation. All that we understand to be good about God is what we ourselves should do towards others. Jesus in many ways showed this example. He was willing to take all of the negative karma of all living beings upon himself so that others did not have to experience its effects because that is what a good God would do for his creation. We should do exactly the same.

We now turn to the refutation of cause that is other.  The following refutes the possibility of creation by an inherently existent God.   In the West, most of us have been brought up to believe in a God that is the creator of all.  We must have some imprints to have been born into a society such as this. We must have some imprints to have met the Christian religion.  Realizing emptiness does not mean we have to reject God, but we need to understand God in a different way. That is all.  We just understand God in a different way.  This is helpful for us and for the flourishing of Kadampa Buddhism in the West. 

Sometimes many Kadampas or Buddhists feel that they need to reject Christianity or Christian teachings. In fact, many of us came into Buddhism by rejecting our Christian past. We sometimes feel the need to debate with our Christian friends or family members, explaining why they are wrong. All of that is completely unnecessary. Indeed, such an approach is often counterproductive because in our rejection of Christianity we wind up rejecting many things that we need to believe in Buddhism. For example, many people reject Christianity because they do not like the teachings on the hell realms, so when they hear them in Buddhist teachings, they either reject them or reject Buddhism altogether. Likewise, because many people wind up rejecting the idea of God, they struggle with understanding correctly the relationship they are supposed to have with Buddhas. Because they reject God, they wind up rejecting many aspects of our reliance upon buddhas that is similar to what the Christians have in their reliance upon God. We reject too much, and wind up creating intellectually formed wrong views which obstruct our ability to realize Dharma. In reality, the only thing we reject about the Christian notion of God is him as an inherently existent creator of all. If we understand the emptiness of God and the emptiness of his creation, then there is absolutely no problem. When we recognize that our mind is the creator of all, the natural conclusion is we need to create a world as a good God would. In other words, we need to engage in tantric practices of building our pure land where all living beings can take rebirth as our guests and then complete the path.

I’d like to share what Geshe-la said in his teachings on Mahamudra.

“In Guide to the Middle Way it says Buddha rejects any creator other than mind. There is a big debate. Many believe the world is created by God. We cannot say their view is mistaken or wrong. There is no meaning in checking others’ view, we don’t know the real meaning of their view. For example, they say God is the creator of all things. We say the mind is the creator, so how do we clarify? Superficially there is a difference.  We cannot say others’ view is mistaken until we understand the real nature of God. We cannot say they are correct or incorrect unless we understand the nature of God. Through their faith, it works. The nature of God is not clear in this society. In Guide to the Bodhisattva’s Way of Life some people say the nature of God is an independent permanent self. Such a self does not exist because self, person, I are the same, and necessarily impermanent. There is no independent self because every self depends upon causes and conditions. At least they are dependent upon imputation by mind.  Some say the nature of God is the four elements. … some say the nature of God is the Dharmakaya, like empty space. The Dharmakaya is generally possessed by Buddhas. The very subtle mind is called the basic Dharmakaya. It is the basis through which we accomplish the actual Dharmakaya. In Buddhism it is given the name Dharmakaya. Therefore, the nature of God is Dharmakaya. This is very comfortable.”

From a Buddhist perspective, we can say everything created by God means everything is created by Dharmakaya.  So we can say the same words, but we understand them differently.  Then, we are able to relate to others without conflict, the Dharma can flourish in Christian societies without tension.

(9.118abc) If you Samkhyas want to say that Ishvara is the creator of all things,
Then please explain who or what Ishvara is.
(Samkhyas) “He is basically the nature of the four great elements.”

The Samkhyas were the Christians of Shantideva’s time, they believed in Ishvara as a God-like creator of all things. Shantideva begins the discussion about production from other by asking the Samkhyas to clarify exactly who or what Ishvara is?

The Samkhyas say that Ishvara is the nature of the four great elements – earth, water, fire, and wind. Every phenomena according to the Samkhyas is some combination or mix of these four elements. Buddhists also agree with this view. They too say that all phenomena are a mix of the four elements. Sometimes, modern people can look at this and find it to be scientifically naive. Phenomena are comprised of elements, but those found on the periodic table, not the four elements of earth, water, fire, and wind. How can we reconcile this? In so many other respects, we can say that modern science is just now starting to catch up with Buddhist teachings, but this discussion of the four elements can seem very archaic.

For Prasangikas this is not a problem. Prasangika’ do not say that things are inherently comprised of earth, water, fire, and wind. They also do not say that things are not comprised of the elements on the periodic table. Rather, they say all things are like holograms. A hologram is something that appears to be one thing when looked at from one perspective and appears to be something else when looked at from a different perspective. For example, the number 6 viewed upside down looks like the number 9. If one person said it is a 6 and the other person said it is a 9, the two could debate endlessly. So what is it? Is it a 6 or is it a 9? It is neither one nor the other, but both simultaneously. All phenomena exist in the same way. To take perhaps a more difficult example, we can look at Donald Trump. For some, he is the worst president ever. For others he is the best president ever. So what is he? Is he the best or the worst president ever? In truth, he is neither one or the other, but both simultaneously. Yes, even Donald Trump is empty.

In the same way, from one perspective we can say all phenomena are comprised of the four elements, and from another perspective they are comprised of the elements on the periodic table. Both views are just different ways of categorizing or understanding or conceptualizing phenomena. Things are neither comprised of the four elements nor comprised of the elements of the periodic table, but are both simultaneously. To debate whether it is one or the other is as asinine as the debate as to whether it is a six or it is a nine.

Each effect is produced from a specific potentiality in its preceding cause.

Nothing arises naturally, does it? Everything arises in dependence upon causes and conditions.  Each distinct effect has its own distinct cause, that is a specific potentiality existing within its preceding cause.  We don’t have to know what specific causes gave rise to specific things like a blue flower, but what is important is to know that everything arises in dependence upon causes and conditions, and is thus empty. 

Here again it is useful to consider what scientists say. In physics, there are two main schools: Newtonian physics and quantum physics. Newtonian physics says everything arises from very specific causes. Quantum physics says things arise independence upon being observed. At a deep level, these two forms of physics are still seem to be contradictory, yet there is an abundance of data which establishes the validity of each. The Holy Grail of physics is to find a way of uniting both Newtonian and quantum physics into one generalized theory of everything. Enormous super colliders have been built around the world to try answer these questions.

Interestingly, Newtonian physics is very similar to the laws of karma, namely everything has a distinct cause and effect. And quantum physics is very similar to the teachings on emptiness, namely things come into existence independence upon being observed by mind. We to tend to grasp at karma and emptiness as being contradictory. We think if things do not exist inherently then how can they possibly cause anything? There must be something there that pushes on something else to create an effect. If there is nothing there, then what causes any effect? This is why understanding the union of karma and emptiness is so important.  The final view that unites these two is the correct view of emptiness.  As long as these two views are seen as contradictory or incompatible, then our understanding is not correct or complete.

Shantideva unapologetically asserts a Newtonian view, namely every effect has a specific cause. It is true we observe all sorts of seemingly random things in daily life, but they seem to be random only because we are not aware of what their causes are.  It does not follow just because we do not know what the cause of something is that it does not have a cause. Our lack of understanding of their causes does not mean they do not have a cause, it simply means we do not know what those causes are. It is exactly the same with karma. There are all sorts of things that we cannot immediately understand the karmic cause of why it arose. But just because we do not understand what karma gave rise to the different appearance does not mean there was not an underlying karma that caused it. Only Buddhas are able to understand exactly the relationship and see the past karmic chains that lead to different effects. The fact that we cannot see it or understand it does not mean that there is not one there.

Likewise, scientists typically divide causes into necessary and sufficient causes. A necessary cause is something that must be for an object to arise, but the presence of a necessary cause does not guarantee about the phenomena will arise. That is why we need the sufficient causes that enable the phenomena to arise. A rainbow is a good example. Without water, a rainbow will not arise. The water is a necessary condition. But it is not sufficient. Without sunlight, the existence of rain alone will not produce a rainbow. In other words, a necessary cause is one where without that cause you cannot have the effect. A sufficient cause is one in which if you have that thing it is sufficient to create the effect. For example, decapitation is sufficient to cause death, but it is not necessary to cause death since many other things can also cause death.

In the Dharma, we divide cause causes differently.  There are two main types of cause: substantial causes and circumstantial causes. The substantial cause is the thing that transforms into the next thing. The circumstantial causes are the causes that bring about the transformation of the substantial cause from one thing into the next thing. For example, the substantial cause of an Oak tree is an acorn. The water, sunlight, and rich soil are the circumstantial causes which enable the transformation of the acorn into an Oak tree.  The circumstantial causes are the various things we would find in science for explaining why things are the way they are. 

While the conventional substantial cause of the Oak tree is the acorn, from a Buddhist perspective objects only come into existence if they are known by mind. Thus, the question is what gives rise to the mind that knows the Oak tree. From the side of the object, there is the substantial cause of the acorn being transformed by the circumstantial causes of water, sunlight, and rich soil. From the side of the mind, there is the substantial cause of the previous moment of mind being transformed by the circumstantial causes of, for example, being at a place in which you can observe an acorn transforming into an Oak tree and having a body with functioning eyes.  But such an analysis is not sufficient. We established earlier in the four close placements of mindfulness that objects and the minds that know them arise in mutual dependence upon one another. Simply looking at the substantial and the circumstantial causes on the side of the object and on the side of the mind is not complete because it still treats the object and the subject as being independent and distinct. In our previous analysis, we saw that mind and its object arise in mutual dependence upon one another. How exactly does this work? As explained before, the quality of the previous moment of mind activates a specific type of karmic seed. When this karmic seed ripens, it produces a subject-object pair of mind and its object that arise in mutual dependence upon one another. The minds generated in this subject-object pair then activate new karma giving rise to the next subject object pair known by the mind. In this way it continues indefinitely like a circle, or like an infinite spiral moving through time.  

If pressed, most of us would not be of the view that there is such a thing as production without cause. We are generally convinced by the idea that everything has a cause, even if we don’t know what that causes. Therefore, it is not that difficult to refute production without a cause.

And now we come to the actual reasonings establishing selfless or emptiness.  In total, Shantideva provides three main lines of reasoning establishing emptiness. The first of these reasonings being the reasoning of vajra fragments or the vajra thunderbolt (a much cooler name, to be sure). This reasoning establishes selflessness by refuting inherently existing production, or how are things created.  The second is the logical reasoning of dependent relationship, which Je Tsongkhapa praises as the king of all reasons. The third is the emptiness of production of phenomena. You can find more detail on all of these in Ocean of Nectar and Meaningful to Behold.  As with all of Shantideva’s instructions, what matters is how we can extract some practical value for our daily lives. We should not relate to this as merely an academic or philosophical exercise.

The refutation of the vajra thunderbolt establishes that all of the different ways in which production lacks inherent existence. Shantideva does so by refuting production from no cause, production from a permanent cause that is other, production from a permanent general principle, again production from no cause, and then production from both self and other. This exhausts all the different possibilities for how a phenomena can be produced. If each one of these is established to be empty, then all forms of production are empty. If all production is empty, then all effects of that production are likewise empty because it is impossible for an empty cause to create a truly existent effect. Thus, by establishing the emptiness of cause and effect, we attained the union of the teachings on conventional truth, or karma, and ultimate truth emptiness. In Je Tsongkhapa’s Three Principal Aspects of the Path he explains that the final view of emptiness is the one in which by affirming karma we establish emptiness, and by affirming emptiness we establish karma.  This relationship is established through the vajra thunderbolt.

The first refutation is the refutation of production without a cause.

(9.116) Even worldly people can see clearly
That most things arise from causes.
The different types of coloured lotus, for example,
Arise from a variety of different causes.

(9.117a) (Charavaka) And what gave rise to that variety of causes?”

This question of the Charavakas is a very common question that modern people ask. How did it all begin? What started at all? The answer scientists give is The Big Bang. Other scientists then say, well what caused The Big Bang? Their answer is it arose from the collision of two different universes which then created our universe. But what then started those other universes? In our mind, there must be some point at which things began here. In the Bible, it says “in the beginning, …”

(9.117b) A previous variety of causes.

The prasangikas do not mess around. They simply say what caused the variety of causes? A previous variety of causes without beginning. Is very difficult for us to understand how something cannot have a beginning because everything we see appears to have a beginning , so we naturally assume the universe as well also has a beginning. There are a couple of analogies which can help us understand how something can exist , function, and change yet not have a beginning. The first is a circle. Where is the beginning of a circle? It has no beginning and it has no end. The second analogy is the ocean. Waves rise and waves fall but the ocean always remains. We can identify the beginning or end of a wave but not the underlying ocean. Now of course, we can identify the beginning of the ocean itself when water arrived on asteroids and hit this planet. But the point is making the distinction between the waves and the ocean. So we need to forget about the fact that the ocean did have the beginning. No analogy is perfect, so we take from the analogy what we need to be able to understand the point of Dharma.

If we think about it carefully, it is impossible to have a beginning. If there is a beginning, what caused the thing to begin? If there was a cause that existed before the beginning then there was something that was there before the beginning and thus the beginning is not the beginning. The only way to establish a beginning would be to say that the beginning itself had no cause. If there was a cause of the beginning, then the beginning would no longer be the beginning because cause must precede effect. This is why the first aspect of the vajra Thunderbolt is refutation of production from no cause.

(9.117cd) (Charavaka) “But how does a distinct cause give rise to a distinct effect?”

The Charavakas again ask a good question, namely how does a specific cause give rise to a specific effect?  The modern equivalent of the Charavakas would be those who believe in chaos theory. Essentially things are so complex, it is impossible to establish cause and effect of anything, it’s as if everything is somewhat random. If people assert that there is anything that is random then that thing is necessarily something without a cause. Most people believe there is a good deal of random in the world. Some things have causes and some things are just random.  Logically, all of the random things that happen are, for believers in random things, things produced with no cause.

How can you establish anything with a consciousness that is truly existent?

The prasangika’s here ask an important question.  How can a truly existent consciousness know anything? And if the truly existent consciousness cannot know anything, then every object known to such a consciousness necessarily also does not exist because such a consciousness cannot know anything. It is like the child of a childless woman.

(9.112) (Chittamatrin) “We can establish that consciousness is truly existent because the objects it apprehends are truly existent.”

Chittamatrins say they can establish truly existent consciousness because the objects known to that consciousness are truly existent. The true existence of the object establishes the true existence of the mind, because how could a non-existent mind know something that is true? Because the object is true, the mind that knows it must also be true.

If you say this, on what basis is the true existence of these objects established,
Given that they and the consciousness that apprehends them are mutually dependent?
Surely this demonstrates that both consciousness and its object lack true existence.

(9.113) For example, if a man has no child, he cannot be a father;
And if there is no father, how can there be a child?
Since without a child, there is no father, they are mutually dependent and therefore neither is truly existent.
It is likewise with consciousness and its object.

This gets to the very heart of the debate between the Chittamatrins and the Prasangikas.  If consciousness were truly existent, and its objects were truly existent, then one could exist without the other.  But in reality, they are mutually dependent upon one another.  We have already gone over this logic a number of times in previous posts.  By definition a truly existent object is one that exists independently of all other phenomena. Likewise, a truly existent mind exists independently of all other phenomena. There is the fundamental problem of contact. How can two completely independent things ever come into contact with one another?  If they can come into contact with one another, then they are altered by that contact.  The mind is clearly altered by coming into contact with the object because it goes from a state of not knowing the object to knowing it.  The object also is altered by the contact, as even quantum physics agrees objects are altered by observing them.  If they are altered by that contact, then they are no longer independent. If they are independent, then they cannot ever come into contact and therefore it is impossible for a truly existent mind to know anything or for a truly existent object to be known. The fact that both object and mind exist in mutual dependence upon one another establishes the non-true existence of both the object and the mind.

(9.114) (Chittamatrin) “From the fact that a truly existent sprout arises from a seed,
We can understand the true existence of the seed.
So why, from the fact that a truly existent consciousness arises from an object,
Can we not understand that the object too is truly existent?”

Here the Chittamatrins say because the sprout is truly existent we can establish that its cause, the seed, is also truly existent. Only a true cause can create a true effect. If we observe a true effect, then we can indirectly establish a true cause. Since the consciousness that knows the object is truly existent, we can establish that the object known by that consciousness is also truly existent. In the analogy, the mind is the sprout and the object is the seed. The true existence of the object is established by the true existence of the mind that knows it. Otherwise, we would have to say a non-existent or falsely existent object gave rise to a truly existent mind, which would be impossible.

It is what we see, isn’t it?  A sprout arising from a seed.  A mind arising from its object.  Mind and its object must have the same nature.  If one is truly existent, the other must be as well.  If one is empty, the other must be as well.  If one is truly existent, it exists independent of the other, so the other must exist independently of it. 

(9.115) It is true that the existence of a seed can be inferred from the existence of its sprout
By a consciousness that is substantially distinct from that sprout;
But what consciousness can cognize a truly existent consciousness
That, according to you, indicates the true existence of its object?

The Prasangikas are quite clever here by using the seed and the sprout analogy against the Chittamatrins. It is true that observing the sprout establishes the existence of the seed, or its cause. All effects must have a cause, so therefore observing an effect establishes the prior existence of a cause. But according to all Buddhist schools, objects are established by being known by a valid mind. The Chittamatrins attempt to establish the true existence of the mind by referring to the true existence of the object, and they established the true existence of the object by referring to the true existence of the mind that knows it. But what mind establishes the true existence of the mind that knows the object? Without a mind that knows the truly existent mind, we cannot establish its existence. Thus, if the Chittamatrins want to assert a truly existent mind they must identify a valid mind that knows that mind. 

So what then establishes the mind?  This is the fundamental question for the debate between the Chittamatrins and the Prasangikas.  The Chittamatrins establish the mind with a self-cognizer, which has been refuted extensively in previous posts.  The Prasangikas establish the mind with the object condition.  If there is an object, there must be a mind.  If the object is empty, the mind must be as well.  No problem.  There is nothing that is the object from the side of the object.  But also there is no mind from the side of the mind.  Both are empty and mutually dependent upon one another.

So we understand the mind is a creator of all.  Everything, everything depends upon mind, and so is by nature empty.   But we must understand too that the mind depends upon that which it creates, and therefore also is by nature empty.  For example, a suffering mind depends upon the samsara or the samsaric world of its own creation, a pure mind depends upon the pure world of its own creation.

More on the creator of the world later.

(9.109) (Other schools) “When an analytical mind realizes an object to be non-truly existent,
Another analytical mind must analyze that mind to realize that it too is non-truly existent.
That analytical mind, in turn, must be analyzed by another,
And so the process is endless, which is absurd.”

The Prasangikas say that we need to realize the emptiness of our mind. All of our contaminated karma is stored on our very subtle mind and by realizing the emptiness of our very subtle mind, we purify our mind of all of the previously accumulated contaminated karma stored on that mind. Here, the other schools say it is impossible to realize the emptiness of both the object and the mind because there needs to be an additional mind that realizes the emptiness of the mind that realizes the emptiness of the object. And there would then need to be another mind that realizes the emptiness of that mind. For everything to be empty and for that emptiness to be knowable there would have to be an infinite regression of minds knowing the emptiness of the other minds, which is impossible. Thus, they say the Prasangika view is absurd.

(9.110) When a valid mind directly realizes the lack of true existence of all phenomena,
The true existence of that mind is implicitly negated at the same time.
This non-true existence of both subject and object
Is also called the “natural state of nirvana”.

One of the fundamental Prasangika tenets is the mutual dependence between subject and object.  They are distinct things, but they exist in mutual dependence upon one another.  In other words, you can’t have an object without a mind and you cannot have a mind without an object.  If you could, then either the mind or its object would exist inherently. 

The Prasangikas escape the problem of an infinite regression of minds by pointing out the mutual dependence of the subject mind and its object is the valid reason establishing the emptiness of both subject and object simultaneously. Thus, we do not need to realize the emptiness of the mind realizing the emptiness of the mind realizing the emptiness of the object because we can establish the emptiness of the mind directly through realizing the mutual dependence between subject and object. This one valid reason establishes the emptiness of both and therefore the emptiness of both can be realized validly. Again, the logic here is simple. If an object truly existed, it would exist independently of all other phenomena. But if the mind and its object arise in mutual dependence upon one another, which Shantideva’s arguments established above, then they clearly cannot exist independently because they have a dependent relationship.

Shantideva is also saying that the subject/object distinction is likewise merely imputed.  The two are actually the same entity, but nominally distinct, like two sides of the same coin.  This has important practical implications because it means if you make the mind pure, then all the objects of mind will necessarily be pure.  And if you engage only pure objects, all minds you generate will necessarily be pure because they must have the same nature.

(9.111abc) Despite your attempts, you Chittamatrins are unable to establish
The true existence of the apprehending mind and the object apprehended.
(Chittamatrin) “On the contrary, forms, for example, are truly existent because consciousness apprehends them to be so.”

Both the Chittamatrins and the Prasangikas agree for an object to exist, it must be able to be established by a valid mind. The Prasangikas say that the Chittamatrins are unable to establish the true existence of the mind with a valid reason. Therefore, the Prasangikas conclude that the truly existent mind asserted by the Chittamatrins does not exist at all.

The Chittamatrins reply by saying the truly existent mind can by established by saying the objects known to that mind are truly existent, therefore the mind that knows them is also truly existent. The true existence of its object establishes the true existence of the mind knowing it.

(9.106) (Other schools) “Well then, it follows that phenomena cannot exist even conventionally,
In which case your presentation of the two truths is invalid.
Moreover, if conventional truths are merely imputed by mistaken minds,
How can living beings pass beyond sorrow even nominally?”

Once again, it is important that we fully internalize the doubts and questions raised by the other schools and realize that we ourselves have these same doubts and questions. Only when we do this will we appreciate the prasangika refutation. First, the other schools say that if the prasangikas are correct, then phenomena cannot exist even conventionally and therefore there is no such thing as the two truths. Buddha explained the two truths: ultimate truth and conventional truth. All Buddhist schools agree there is ultimate truth and conventional truth. Where they differ is in the meaning of these terms. The other schools are saying if things do not exist inherently then things do not exist at all, so to say things do not exist inherently is to say there are no conventional truths, and thus there can be no presentation of the two truths.

Additionally, the other schools say if there are no conventional truths, then it is impossible for beings to attain enlightenment because we do so in dependence upon conventional truths. If conventional truths are mistaken, then how can they produce an unmistaken mind? A mistaken cause cannot create an unmistaken effect.

(9.107) According to our system, to exist conventionally
Does not mean to be imputed by a mind grasping at true existence.
A conventional truth, such as body, is imputed by a valid conceptual mind having perceived a valid basis of imputation.
Without such imputation by a valid mind, there would be no conventional truths.

The Prasangikas answer this doubt by saying they do not deny the existence of conventional truths, they deny the conventional truths as understood by the lower schools. The lower schools all grasp at conventional truths as existing inherently or existing truly. It is this form of conventional truth that the Prasangikas negate.

The conventional truth that the Prasangikas assert is a valid conceptual imputation upon a valid basis of imputation. For example, a forest is a mere imputation by mind, a label, that we impute upon a collection of trees. An army is a mere name imputed by mind upon a collection of soldiers. The forest and the army are by nature mere projections or imputations by mind, but they are valid imputations because they are imputed upon a valid basis of imputation for that object. For an imputation to be valid the basis of imputation has to conventionally correspond with the nature, aspect, and function of the object being imputed as understood in society. For example, a tennis racquet can strain the water out of spaghetti, but it is not a valid basis of imputation for imputing a spaghetti strainer. While the function is accomplished, the nature and aspect do not correspond to conventional understandings.

(9.108) The imputing mind and the object imputed
Are established in mutual dependence upon each other.
Each distinct phenomenon is posited by an analytical mind
According to what is validly known in the world.

How are conventional truths established?  As explained above, they need to have a conventionally valid nature, aspect, and function.  Nature generally refers to what the object is made of, or its uncommon characteristic.  For example, the nature of a gold coin is the gold itself.  According to the Tantra Prasangika view, the conventional nature of all objects is mind and the ultimate nature of the object is the emptiness of the object, or the emptiness of the mind.  Aspect refers to the form that the object takes, for example, the gold in the shape or aspect of a coin.  Function refers to what it does, what it accomplishes.  In the case of a gold coin, we can use it to buy things.  Nature, aspect, and function are what constitute a valid basis of imputation.  It is just convention to call things with different natures, aspects and functions different names.  The only thing negated by emptiness is its mode of existing independent of the mind.  It is just an object of mind, nothing more.

Here Shantideva also emphasizes that objects and the minds that know them arise in mutual dependence upon one another.  This is central to the Prasangika understanding of emptiness. All Buddhist schools agree all existent things are knowable by mind. To say there is something that is not knowable by mind is to say that Buddha is not omniscient. The lower schools believe that there are objects that exist from their own side independently of mind and that there are minds that exist from their own side independently of their objects. This corresponds with our normal way of thinking about things. We think objects exist out there and our mind, existing separately from those objects, knows them. Our mind has no role in the creation of the objects, we simply know what is there.

The Prasangikas, in contrast, say that mind and its object arise in mutual dependence upon one another.  They say it is impossible to have a mind without an object known to that mind, and it is impossible to have an object without a mind that knows it. Thinking deeply about the dependent relationship between object and mind reveals the lack of inherent existence of both the mind and the objects known to mind. Truly existent minds and truly existent objects exist independently of all other phenomena. If they exist independently then how can they enter into a relationship with one another?  If they have a relationship with one another, then there must be some sort of dependent relationship between them. We can even say that the definition of a truly existent object is an object that can exist without being known by mind. And the definition of a truly existent mind is one that could exist without an object being known by that mind. But such things are clearly impossible and have never been seen. Simply understanding the dependent relationship between mind and its object reveals the emptiness of both.

But this then begs the question how do the pairs of mind and object arise in dependence upon one another?  Do they simply arise out of nothingness without a cause? We will get into the answers to these questions when we look at the logic of the Vajra Thunderbolt. The short answer is when a karmic seed ripens, it produces the subject-object pair simultaneously. The quality of the previous mind determines the quality of the karma that gets activated. So we have a self-perpetuateing cycle in which mind activates karma, and karma produces subject-object pairs.