Modern Bodhisattva’s Way of Life: Where Chittamatrins and Prasangikas Disagree

How can you establish anything with a consciousness that is truly existent?

The prasangika’s here ask an important question.  How can a truly existent consciousness know anything? And if the truly existent consciousness cannot know anything, then every object known to such a consciousness necessarily also does not exist because such a consciousness cannot know anything. It is like the child of a childless woman.

(9.112) (Chittamatrin) “We can establish that consciousness is truly existent because the objects it apprehends are truly existent.”

Chittamatrins say they can establish truly existent consciousness because the objects known to that consciousness are truly existent. The true existence of the object establishes the true existence of the mind, because how could a non-existent mind know something that is true? Because the object is true, the mind that knows it must also be true.

If you say this, on what basis is the true existence of these objects established,
Given that they and the consciousness that apprehends them are mutually dependent?
Surely this demonstrates that both consciousness and its object lack true existence.

(9.113) For example, if a man has no child, he cannot be a father;
And if there is no father, how can there be a child?
Since without a child, there is no father, they are mutually dependent and therefore neither is truly existent.
It is likewise with consciousness and its object.

This gets to the very heart of the debate between the Chittamatrins and the Prasangikas.  If consciousness were truly existent, and its objects were truly existent, then one could exist without the other.  But in reality, they are mutually dependent upon one another.  We have already gone over this logic a number of times in previous posts.  By definition a truly existent object is one that exists independently of all other phenomena. Likewise, a truly existent mind exists independently of all other phenomena. There is the fundamental problem of contact. How can two completely independent things ever come into contact with one another?  If they can come into contact with one another, then they are altered by that contact.  The mind is clearly altered by coming into contact with the object because it goes from a state of not knowing the object to knowing it.  The object also is altered by the contact, as even quantum physics agrees objects are altered by observing them.  If they are altered by that contact, then they are no longer independent. If they are independent, then they cannot ever come into contact and therefore it is impossible for a truly existent mind to know anything or for a truly existent object to be known. The fact that both object and mind exist in mutual dependence upon one another establishes the non-true existence of both the object and the mind.

(9.114) (Chittamatrin) “From the fact that a truly existent sprout arises from a seed,
We can understand the true existence of the seed.
So why, from the fact that a truly existent consciousness arises from an object,
Can we not understand that the object too is truly existent?”

Here the Chittamatrins say because the sprout is truly existent we can establish that its cause, the seed, is also truly existent. Only a true cause can create a true effect. If we observe a true effect, then we can indirectly establish a true cause. Since the consciousness that knows the object is truly existent, we can establish that the object known by that consciousness is also truly existent. In the analogy, the mind is the sprout and the object is the seed. The true existence of the object is established by the true existence of the mind that knows it. Otherwise, we would have to say a non-existent or falsely existent object gave rise to a truly existent mind, which would be impossible.

It is what we see, isn’t it?  A sprout arising from a seed.  A mind arising from its object.  Mind and its object must have the same nature.  If one is truly existent, the other must be as well.  If one is empty, the other must be as well.  If one is truly existent, it exists independent of the other, so the other must exist independently of it. 

(9.115) It is true that the existence of a seed can be inferred from the existence of its sprout
By a consciousness that is substantially distinct from that sprout;
But what consciousness can cognize a truly existent consciousness
That, according to you, indicates the true existence of its object?

The Prasangikas are quite clever here by using the seed and the sprout analogy against the Chittamatrins. It is true that observing the sprout establishes the existence of the seed, or its cause. All effects must have a cause, so therefore observing an effect establishes the prior existence of a cause. But according to all Buddhist schools, objects are established by being known by a valid mind. The Chittamatrins attempt to establish the true existence of the mind by referring to the true existence of the object, and they established the true existence of the object by referring to the true existence of the mind that knows it. But what mind establishes the true existence of the mind that knows the object? Without a mind that knows the truly existent mind, we cannot establish its existence. Thus, if the Chittamatrins want to assert a truly existent mind they must identify a valid mind that knows that mind. 

So what then establishes the mind?  This is the fundamental question for the debate between the Chittamatrins and the Prasangikas.  The Chittamatrins establish the mind with a self-cognizer, which has been refuted extensively in previous posts.  The Prasangikas establish the mind with the object condition.  If there is an object, there must be a mind.  If the object is empty, the mind must be as well.  No problem.  There is nothing that is the object from the side of the object.  But also there is no mind from the side of the mind.  Both are empty and mutually dependent upon one another.

So we understand the mind is a creator of all.  Everything, everything depends upon mind, and so is by nature empty.   But we must understand too that the mind depends upon that which it creates, and therefore also is by nature empty.  For example, a suffering mind depends upon the samsara or the samsaric world of its own creation, a pure mind depends upon the pure world of its own creation.

More on the creator of the world later.

What do you think?